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Women and the Law: 
A Dialogue with 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
With this issue, we begin a dialogue on 
women and the law. We are interested in 
receiving brief comments as well as longer 
essays on legal issues of general concern. 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg is a professor of law 
at Columbia University. Many of the cases 
she bas argued have been pivotal in the 
Supreme Court's recognition of the exist· 
ence of women's rights in this country. 
The following discussion was held in 
April 1975 with representatives of the 
Association of Women in Science (A WIS). 
It is reprinted, with permission, from the 
Spring 1975 (Vol. IV, No. 2) issue of the 
AWIS Newsletter. 
AWIS: Professor Ginsburg, having argued 
several important sex-discrimination cases 
before the Supreme Court, which one 
would you consider pivotal in terms of 
women's rights? 
GINSBURG: Each case that has been 
successful in the Supreme Court has been 
an important advance. The first case in 
which the Supreme Court responded to a 
woman's complaint of sex discrimination 
under the Constitution was Reed v. Reed 
(414 U.S. 71). In that case, I prepared the 
brief together with ACLU's legal director 
and several law students. Idaho lawyers 
argued the case. It was a very simple legal 
issue; the statute stated that when two per· 
sons were related to a decedent in the same 
degree, and both wanted to be appointed 
administrator of the estate, and one was 
female and the other was male, the male 
had to be preferred to the female. Almost 
anyone would recognize that the statute 
was discriminatory, and you might think 
the issue too obvious to yield a major 
precedent. However, it was tremendously 
significant in that it represented the first 
time ever in the history of the country 
that the Supreme Court had said yes to a 
woman; the first time the Court recog-
nized women as victims of discrimination. 
A Favor 
to the Ladies 
AWIS: When was that? 
GINSBURG: 1971. The Reed case was 
also significant because it was a unanimous 
decision. Until 1971, when a woman came 
to the Court with a complaint of discrimi-
nation against her, the Court found some 
reason to uphold the law. Efforts to use 
the 14th Amendment to give women the 
right to vote failed, and it took a consti· 
tutional amendment to correct this. 
Efforts to obtain a Supreme Court declara· 
tion that women should be on juries the 
same way men are were not successful 
until this year. Laws that restricted 
women's opportunities in the labor market 
were accepted on the grounds that they 
helped and protected women, even if they 
meant a woman could not bid for a job 
which she wanted because she was not per· 
mitted to work more than a certain number 
of hours per day. Almost every time a 
classification based on sex came before the 
Court, the Justices ruled that the gender 
line would be regarded as a favor to the 
ladies. In Reed v. Reed, the Supreme 
Court said that legislatures could not con· 
tinue to make these gross classifications 
based on sex alone. 
Children Declared Parentless 
The next case, Stanley v. Illinois (405 
U.S. 645), followed soon after Reed. 
Peter Stanley had lived with a woman 18 
years, the couple had three children, and 
she died. They had never married and the 
state declared the children paren tless. 
Peter Stanley, with the aid of a legal ser· 
vices attorney, challenged the law that 
declared him a nonparent. The legislation 
was based on the presumption that a 
woman, married or not, loved her children, 
and would want them; a man who was not 
married would have no affection for these 
children, and would not want custody . 
The Court said in 1972 that although this 
may be true in a great many cases, it's not 
true in all cases, and that Peter Stanley 
should have a presumed right to custody. 
Breadwinners and Dependents 
In 197 3, a major precedent was set in 
Frontiero v. Richardson (411 U.S. 677). 
Married military men were paid a housing 
allowance and provided free medical and 
dental care for their wives. Servicewomen 
who were married received no housing 
allowance and no free medical or dental 
care for their husbands unless the woman 
proved that she contributed more than 
half her husband's support (more than 
three-quarters support of the family unit). 
Lt. Sharron Frontiero was supplying more 
than half of the total family income. 
However, since her husband was providing 
just over half of his own support, or one· 
quarter of the family support, he didn't 
qualify for medical or dental benefits, and 
the family unit didn't qualify for a housing 
allowance. The Supreme Court said that 
this was unconstitutional. Four of the 
Justices joined in an opinion declaring that 
sex classifications should be reviewed with 
the same stringency as race classifications. 
Four others purported to apply the test 
that what the legislature does must be 
rational. Eight Justices agreed that it was 
irrational to give these benefits to the 
serviceman for his family and not to the 
servicewoman for her family. Frontiero 
v. Richardson was very important, more 
important than Reed v. Reed, because it 
hit at the line drawn most frequently in 
the law between men and women, a line 
that types males as breadwinners, females 
asdependents . Our social security laws are 
based on that model. As Martha Griffiths 
has put it, when our social security laws 
came in in the late 1930s, they presumed 
a land where all men were breadwinners 
and all women were men's dependents. 
As we progress in time, that pattern be-
comes less and less true. When you type 
the woman as a dependent and you benefit 
her only when she conforms to that vision, 
you disadvantage her when she's working. 
So the Frontiero case was a vital break· 
through. The decision indicated that the 
Court was going to take a close look at 
classifications that treat breadwinner as a 
synonym for man, and dependent as a 
synonym for woman. 
25 
Mrs. Robinson's Beauty Parlor for Negroes, c. 1919. Byron Collection, Museum of the City of New 
York. Between 1880 and 1920, the number of women who listed themselves for the New York City 
census as hairdressers jumped from 410 to 3,691. From "Women at Work" exhibition. 
The most recent case developing the 
Frontiero theme was Weinberger v. 
Wiesenfeld (decided March 19, 197 5 ), and 
it involved exactly the same type of as-
sumption on the part of the legislature. 
If a wage-earning ma~ dies and leaves a 
child and spouse, the child and widow 
get social security benefits on the assump-
tion that the widow will want to stay home 
and take care of the child. If a wage-earn-
ing woman dies leaving a spouse with minor 
children in his care, the law doesn't pro-
vide any benefits for the widower. The 
Congressional assumption was that no 
father would want to stay home and take 
care of the child. We don't even give him 
the choice. He's supposed to be out there 
winning bread; he 's not supposed to be at 
home. The whole effort in the several sex-
discrimination cases I helped brief and 
argued as an ACLU attorney (including 
Frontiero and Wiesenfeld) was to get the 
courts to appreciate that classification by 
gender is invidious, and just as invidious as 
classification by the color of your skin, 
your religion, or where your ancestors 
came from. The law should be neutral. 
It's perfectly all right for the law to class-
ify on the basis of a function a person per-
forms, so it can deal with a homemaker or 
a wage-earner, but it can't use man in lieu 
26 




AWIS: Can you discuss any pending cases? 
GINSBURG: Yes, several cases involve 
principal wage-earner tests in employment. 
The Constitutional cases must involve 
government employment, or employment-
related social security benefits,because the 
Constitutional protection is only against 
state action, not private action. One such 
case involves a federal agency that paid 
certain fringe benefits to a worker if that 
worker supplied 55 percent or more of the 
family income. The classification is not 
based on sex, at least on the face of it. 
The principal wage-earner gets the benefits 
and the other doesn't. In practice, how-
ever, that test says: the men get it and the 
women don't. Historically, women have 
been underpaid. They are pushed into 
"woman's work" that gets paid less, and 
even when they do the same work as men, 
they're not paid the same. We're trying to 
challenge labels that are subterfuges for 
discrimination that was once established 
by male and female classifications. 
The ERA 
AWIS: What do you feel are the pros and 
cons of the Equal Rights Amendment? 
GINSBURG: First, I should disclose my 
clear partisanship on this issue. I am a 
strong proponent of the ERA. I think it is 
necessary because we've never had in our 
Constitution any statement reflecting the 
view of our Constitution-makers that 
women should have equal rights with men. 
Certainly, in the 18th century that was 
very far from the minds of the founding 
fathers. They lived in a world where 
married women had no independent prop-
erty or contract rights and the husband 
was the boss. This was the system we in-
herited from England. The notion was that 
husband and wife were one, and the hus-
band was the one . Nor was sex equality 
in the minds of the framers of the 14th 
Amendment. The Reconstruction Con-
gress dealt with the burning issue of that 
day, one that eclipsed all others ~ eradica-
tion of the odi_ous institution of black 
slavery. There has never been deliberate 
attention by anyone responsible for our 
fundamental law to the proposition that 
men and women should be treated equally 
under the law. Because it is such a funda-
mental principle, it should be reflected 
directly in the Constitution. 
AWIS: Senator Ervin, a Constitutional 
authority, feels there are enough safe-
guards in the Constitution as it now stands. 
What is he referring to? 
GINSBURG: I don't think Sen. Ervin has 
given this issue the very careful attention 
he has given to some other areas of the 
law where he is a great Constitutional ex-
pert. In part his views are colored by his 
own life experiences and by his own inter-
nalization of notions many men hold 
today: that all differentials between men 
and women created by the law are designed 
to favor women . I think there is some of 
that southern gentlemanly chivalry behind 
the position that he takes . I have read 
what he has said in the Congressional de-
bates, and I think part of the problem is 
that he has just shut his mind to the other 
side. Nobody who reads Constitutional 
history can really think that during the 
past century the equal protection clause 
has been a meaningful protection for 
women. It was no protection at all until 
1971, and even now the Court does feel 
the restraint of history. It can go only so 
far in dynamically interpreting a provision 
that was not intended to have anything.to 
do with women. 
Storming the W.C. 
Some of the objections that Senator 
Ervin has raised border on the ridiculous. 
For example, he said in debate in Congress 
that we are not going to have separate 
bathrooms anymore. But he knows that 
there are many instances where two Con-
stitutional principles have to be harmonized 
and the Supreme Court has said there is a 
right to privacy, as a matter of Constitu-
tional principle. Try to imagine who would 
challenge that type of separation. Is it a 
., 
man who wants access to the woman's 
W.C. or a woman who wants access to the 
man's? Another objection is that ERA 
would eliminate the protective legislation 
for women, but Sen. Ervin should know 
that is also a disingenuous objection. Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 says 
that for employment purposes men and 
women are to be treated equally and that 
any protective law must protect both sexes. 
It should be apparent that many protective 
laws have been used to protect men's jobs 
from women's competition. However, 
protective (or restrictive) labor legislation 
for women only is dead as a Constitutional 
issue; it's been handled on a statutory level 
under Title VII and the ERA won't con-
tribute anything new in that area. ERA 
would simply duplicate the statutory com-
mand that safety and health protection 
should be available for all workers. 
Sen. Ervin is also troubled by the pros-
pect of the military service for women. 
I don't think he's ever taken a serious look 
at the other side of that coin. At the 
present time there are women who want 
military careers or access to the military 
academies and who don't have the same 
opportunities as men. There are highly 
restrictive quotas for women who want to 
enlist; they have to meet higher qualifica-
tions than men, and they are denied many 
training and educational opportunities 
open to men. If you have a sex-neutral 
system, that doesn't mean every woman 
will be packed off to war. All the amend-
ment prohibits is drawing the line on the 
basis of sex. Distinctions, of course, may 
be made on the basis of individual quali-
fications. If draft calls are ever reinstituted, 
Two Views of Maternity. Left, "Mother About to Wash Her Sleepy Child" (1880), by Mary Cassatt. Oil on canvas. Source: Los Angeles County 
Museum of Art. Right, "Maternity" (1946), by Dorothea Tanning. Oil on canvas. Source: Collection of Jeffrey H. Loria. Both from "Women Artists: 
1550-1950" exhibition, Brooklyn Museum. 
27 
exemptions could be provided for indi-
viduals with primary responsibility for the 
care of children, for example. And women 
as well as men who cannot pass physical 
fitness tests would be screened out. 
A Fair Shake 
in Academia? 
AWIS: Is it legal for graduate schools to 
put restrictions on women? Some depart-
ments have said women cannot marry or 
have children during their graduate 
education. 
GINSBURG: Absolutely illegal. That is 
clear under the HEW higher education 
guidelines. They cannot differentiate in 
their treatment of male and female em-
ployees. As far as their students are con-
cerned, that is covered by Title IX of the 
Educational Amendments of 1972. Title 
IX guidelines are about to be issued in 
final form and they prohibit that kind of 
differential. If you want to have a rule 
that says anybody who has children can't 
be a student or teacher here, that's per-
haps an option; but you can't limit that to 
any woman. And what institution and 
department would shun men who have 
married or become fathers? 
AWIS: What about women who have 
dropped out of programs for these reasons -
do they have avenues to get back into 
school? And what about lost benefits? 
GINSBURG: The woman would have a 
problem if she doesn't make a timely ob-
jection to discriminatory treatment, when 
the law is there to protect her. 
AWIS: HEW has the authority to bar funds 
to employers who discriminate on the basis 
of sex, many complaints have been filed, 
and yet no funds have been barred. Why 
not? 
GINSBURG: Because first of all it's a 
matter of low priority for HEW . Second, 
government officials don't want to use the 
ultimate sanction. They prefer to deal 
with universities in terms of gentle persua -
s10n. 
AWIS: Have they been successful in using 
these other avenues? 
GINSBURG: No, I think that women who 
want a fair shake in academia cannot , ely 
on HEW to achieve the result for them . A 
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much more helpful avenue is Title VII 
where the woman who feels she's been the 
victim of discrimination doesn't have to 
rely on any federal agency to make her 
case for her. She has to file an administra-
tive complaint with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, but if the Com-
mission doesn't act or accomplish the de-
sired result, she can go right into court with 
her own representative and be her own 
"champion ." 
The Letter But 
Not the Spirit 
AWIS: Have the courts begun to recog-
nize that some institutions are supporting 
the letter of the law, but certainly not the 
spirit of the law? 
GINSBURG: Yes. You can see that in one 
case in particular, against the University of 
Pittsburgh in the Sharon Johnson case . 
(Principal counsel for plaintiff was Sylvia 
Roberts.) It's far from over, but there's 
already one spectacular district court 
opinion, granting temporary injunctive 
relief. The University was stopped from 
throwing her out while they argued the 
merits of the case . The University would 
have liked to have gotten rid of her and 
then she would have had to fight her way 
back in from the outside. The court said 
she had shown enough to indicate that a 
vast pattern of discrimination against 
women and blacks might exist in the Uni-
versity from top to bottom. In this case, 
EEOC had conducted an investigation of 
all job categories from the bottom rung 
up to the tenure ranks, and the figures they 
came up with created large suspicions. The 
court said: based on the evidence presented, 
she keeps her job during the period of the 
lawsuit. We're not deciding ultimately 
who's right or wrong, she's shown us a 
strong enough case for us to say, the 
status quo should be maintained pending 
a full hearing and determination. 
AWIS: Do you think Affirmative Action 
has helped women in the university? 
GINSBURG: I don't think the universities 
have moved very much under Affirmative 
Action-there is no clout behind any of 
HEW's directives . However, there is some-
thing about establishing a legal norm, even 
if it doesn't get enforced the way it should 
be. Discrimination is no longer as respect-
able as it once was. 
A Postscript 
The following is a postscript added by 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg in 1977 : 
Since 197 5, the Supreme Court's perform-
ance in gender-discrimination cases has 
been unsteady. The Court has ruled that a 
state may not establish different majority 
ages for girls and boys for purposes of pur-
chasing 3.2 beer (Craig v. Boren , 1976). 
It has held that Congress may not differ-
entiate by gender in allocating old-age and 
survivors' benefits to the spouse of a wage-
earner covered by social security (Califano 
v. Goldfarb, 1977). Attempting to dis-
tinguish genuinely compensatory legisla-
tion from laws rooted in "romantic pa-
ternalism" and "role-typing," the Court 
upheld the more favorable social security 
benefit calculation accorded working 
women until 1972 (Califano v. Webster, 
1977). All these decisions are on the plus 
side. On the other hand, the Court de-
clared, in General Electric v. Gilbert, 
197 6, that discrimination based on preg-
nancy is not gender-based discrimination 
at all! And confronted with the question 
of whether Philadelphia could exclude 
girls from Central High, the city 's oldest 
and most prestigious public secondary 
school, the Court threw up its hands. 
Split down the middle after reading the 
briefs and hearing arguments, the Justices 
could take no action, and the judgment 
handed down (2-1 for the School District) 
remains the last word in the controvers y 
( Vorchh eim er v. School District of Phila-
delphia , 1977) . 
Still conspicuous is the Court's tendency 
to shy away from doctrinal developm ent . 
The Equal Rights Amendment would re-
lieve the Court's anxiety, its reluctance to 
shape new Constitutional doctrine without 
a firm root for that doctrine in the nation's 
fundamental instrument of government. D 
